It was announced today that Disney is acquiring Marvel Comics (subject to a Marvel shareholder vote and various regulatory reviews). Key result? At long last, Howard the Duck may be able to take off his pants.
You don't know Howard the Duck? I refer not to the best-ignored, misbegotten George Lucas movie of that name, but to the brilliant comic book series, originally written by Steve Gerber.
In the 1970s, some execs at Disney raised concerns that consumers might confuse Howard the Duck (a cigar-chomping, jacket-and-tie wearing, wise-cracking duck) with Donald Duck (a sailor-shirt wearing duck). The Disney lawyers threatened Marvel, who agreed to make some changes, key among them being that Howard would henceforth wear pants.
Now that Disney will control both Howard and Donald, maybe Howard can finally remove those confining pants and re-expose his tail feathers in all their glory.
Monday, August 31, 2009
Monday, August 17, 2009
Hollywood battles discounted DVD rentals
In my recent post about the pricing of e-books, I mentioned that 20th Century Fox (among other studios) has concerns about the $1 per night DVD rentals offered by Redbox kiosks devaluing their movies in consumers' eyes. Fox proposed withholding their DVDs from Redbox until 30 days after the initial release of a DVD. Two additional chapters in this story (as reported by PaidContent):
1) In response, Redbox sued Fox.
2) And, going a step further than Fox did, Warners now proposes a similar delay in providing DVDs to Netflix.
Expect more battling lawsuits as each party tries to assert its power and control over pricing and availability.
The first-sale doctrine allows the purchasers of copyrighted works to dispose of them as they see fit: sale, rental, gift, garbage. That is what originally allowed stores to rent video tapes.
Thus, some Redbox employees are now buying DVDs at retail outlets in order to stock their vending machines. Warner and Fox have no recourse over this tactic; but, given the price-points, this is not a long-term solution for Redbox.
I'm all for the efforts to keep the prices of movies and books from dropping. After all, I've made my living in the entertainment and media business for decades. And I'm writing a book.
But I do see the arguments (especially in this economy) for making some prices somewhat lower.
Anti-trust and other regulations prevent the studios, publishers, and retailers from getting together in a room to discuss this. So we'll continue to see individual companies pursing various tactics, until an unofficial consensus is reached.
1) In response, Redbox sued Fox.
2) And, going a step further than Fox did, Warners now proposes a similar delay in providing DVDs to Netflix.
Expect more battling lawsuits as each party tries to assert its power and control over pricing and availability.
The first-sale doctrine allows the purchasers of copyrighted works to dispose of them as they see fit: sale, rental, gift, garbage. That is what originally allowed stores to rent video tapes.
Thus, some Redbox employees are now buying DVDs at retail outlets in order to stock their vending machines. Warner and Fox have no recourse over this tactic; but, given the price-points, this is not a long-term solution for Redbox.
I'm all for the efforts to keep the prices of movies and books from dropping. After all, I've made my living in the entertainment and media business for decades. And I'm writing a book.
But I do see the arguments (especially in this economy) for making some prices somewhat lower.
Anti-trust and other regulations prevent the studios, publishers, and retailers from getting together in a room to discuss this. So we'll continue to see individual companies pursing various tactics, until an unofficial consensus is reached.
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Pricing atoms vs bytes: paper vs e-books
Book publishers list the official retail prices of their e-books the same as their newly-published hardcovers (for example, $25.95 for The Girl Who Played with Fire by Stieg Larsson). Retailers pay roughly 50% of the retail price for their books (the actual discount varies based on volume and other factors). While Amazon and Barnes & Noble compete to offer lower prices on the hardcovers (now $14.27 to $16.86 for Larsson's book), they don't lose money on them. With e-books, they take a different tack: the price is $9.99 at both Amazon and B&N, meaning that they lose money on every sale. (That's only $2 more than the list price on the mass-market paperback, which won't be published until March 2010.)
In effect, Amazon and B&N are turning an old marketing ploy on its head -- they are giving away the blades to try to sell more razors.
While publishers collect the same wholesale price regardless of the ultimate retail selling price of the e-books, they are not happy about the e-book pricing. For decades, books have appeared first in hardcover, followed many months later by a cheaper paperback. If you want the book immediately, buy the expensive hardcover; if you can wait, buy the cheaper paperback. With Amazon and B&N e-book pricing, it is now possible to buy a brand-new book at nearly the paperback price.
The publishers' concerns are two-fold: (a) the $9.99 price will devalue books in the eyes of consumers, and (b) at some point Amazon and B&N will tire of losing money on e-books, and will then pressure the publishers to reduce the "official" retail prices on them to the price consumers have come to expect.
There is a reasonable argument to be made that the price of an e-book should be somewhat lower than the paper book, because there are no manufacturing or distribution costs. On the other hand, the consumer is still buying the ability to read the book, regardless of the format. Some have argued that the paper versions remain much easier to read, with crisper type and higher contrast; others point to the convenience and lightness of the e-book reader device. On the whole, there may be balance here.
I suspect that publishers would not be averse to a small reduction in the price of e-books, perhaps in the range of $2-$5 off the retail price of the hardcover. However, this would also cut into the royalties payable to the author of the book -- author royalties are typically a percentage of the retail price-point.
From the book-buyers' point-of-view, the publisher and the retailer are middlemen, standing between the reader and the author. Perhaps if the savings in "manufacturing" e-books could lead to an increase in author royalties, then book-buyers would be more amenable to the limitations inherent in the e-book format?
Note of Interest: The movie studios are facing a somewhat similar problem now, as several of them are refusing to provide DVDs to Redbox, which offers $1 DVD rentals from its vending machines. The studios are concerned that the $1 price would devalue the movie in consumers' eyes. 20th Century Fox, for example, is proposing a delay of 30 days after a movie's release on DVD before it would be available for Redbox $1 rentals.
In effect, Amazon and B&N are turning an old marketing ploy on its head -- they are giving away the blades to try to sell more razors.
While publishers collect the same wholesale price regardless of the ultimate retail selling price of the e-books, they are not happy about the e-book pricing. For decades, books have appeared first in hardcover, followed many months later by a cheaper paperback. If you want the book immediately, buy the expensive hardcover; if you can wait, buy the cheaper paperback. With Amazon and B&N e-book pricing, it is now possible to buy a brand-new book at nearly the paperback price.
The publishers' concerns are two-fold: (a) the $9.99 price will devalue books in the eyes of consumers, and (b) at some point Amazon and B&N will tire of losing money on e-books, and will then pressure the publishers to reduce the "official" retail prices on them to the price consumers have come to expect.
There is a reasonable argument to be made that the price of an e-book should be somewhat lower than the paper book, because there are no manufacturing or distribution costs. On the other hand, the consumer is still buying the ability to read the book, regardless of the format. Some have argued that the paper versions remain much easier to read, with crisper type and higher contrast; others point to the convenience and lightness of the e-book reader device. On the whole, there may be balance here.
I suspect that publishers would not be averse to a small reduction in the price of e-books, perhaps in the range of $2-$5 off the retail price of the hardcover. However, this would also cut into the royalties payable to the author of the book -- author royalties are typically a percentage of the retail price-point.
From the book-buyers' point-of-view, the publisher and the retailer are middlemen, standing between the reader and the author. Perhaps if the savings in "manufacturing" e-books could lead to an increase in author royalties, then book-buyers would be more amenable to the limitations inherent in the e-book format?
Note of Interest: The movie studios are facing a somewhat similar problem now, as several of them are refusing to provide DVDs to Redbox, which offers $1 DVD rentals from its vending machines. The studios are concerned that the $1 price would devalue the movie in consumers' eyes. 20th Century Fox, for example, is proposing a delay of 30 days after a movie's release on DVD before it would be available for Redbox $1 rentals.
Friday, July 10, 2009
Pixar 10, Wall Street 0
A few months back, I chastised Wall Street analysts (who were unable to mind their own store) for trying to become movie critics by predicting that Pixar's Up would be a flop.
They were wrong. Again. But at least one has apologized for the error.
As Brooks Barnes reported in yesterday's New York Times, analyst Richard Greenfield of Pali Research admitted to being "dead wrong" in predicting that Up would flop.
If only Wall Street were as forthcoming about all its mistakes.
They were wrong. Again. But at least one has apologized for the error.
As Brooks Barnes reported in yesterday's New York Times, analyst Richard Greenfield of Pali Research admitted to being "dead wrong" in predicting that Up would flop.
If only Wall Street were as forthcoming about all its mistakes.
Saturday, July 4, 2009
The NCAA is like Google? Unfairly profiting on the backs of others
Over the weekend, Katie Thomas reported in the NY Times that several college athletes have filed lawsuits against Electronic Arts (EA) over the use of their likenesses in video games. (While the video games don't actually use the players' names, the games utilize the players' numbers, hometowns, height, weight, and other stats. Eventually, a judge or jury will likely decide whether these data points constitute a recognizable "likeness".)
The NCAA has endorsed the games and shares in their profits. At the same time, the NCAA also imposes rules preventing college players from profiting from their own celebrity.
This strikes me as remarkably similar to one of my complaints about the proposed Google Books settlement -- that the libraries, whose work made Google Books possible, get nothing from the proposed settlement. In fact, the libraries weren't even allowed at the negotiating table.
In the same way, the NCAA negotiated deals with EA, allowing use of the athletes' likenesses. And the athletes were prohibited from the negotiating table.
This doesn't seem fair either, does it? Note that I am not critiquing specific details of the deals (I do not know any details of the NCAA / EA deal). I am critiquing the fact key parties in each case were not allowed a seat at the table.
On the issue of fairness, I was recently asked whether some Hollywood movie deals were "fair". If the actor/writer/talent/creator had a seat at the negotiating table, odds are that I would deem the deal to be "fair" -- they had a chance to either negotiate a "better" deal, or walk away from the deal if they didn't like the terms.
Two successful mystery writers dealt with the situation differently. At the time that Sara Paretsky sold Disney the movie rights to her heroine V.I. Warshawsky, Paretsky was quoted as saying she knew she might never see money beyond her advance, and that she would have minimal input on the movie...but that the advance meant she could realize her dream of becoming a full-time writer. On the other hand, Sue Grafton has refused from the beginning to sell the movie rights to her Kinsey Millhone series, because she was afraid of what Hollywood might do to her characters. [Note: I cannot find online citations for these, but my recollections are quite clear.]
Both Paretsky and Grafton had a seat at the table, and they made their own informed decisions. If only the libraries and the college athletes had that same opportunity.
The NCAA has endorsed the games and shares in their profits. At the same time, the NCAA also imposes rules preventing college players from profiting from their own celebrity.
This strikes me as remarkably similar to one of my complaints about the proposed Google Books settlement -- that the libraries, whose work made Google Books possible, get nothing from the proposed settlement. In fact, the libraries weren't even allowed at the negotiating table.
In the same way, the NCAA negotiated deals with EA, allowing use of the athletes' likenesses. And the athletes were prohibited from the negotiating table.
This doesn't seem fair either, does it? Note that I am not critiquing specific details of the deals (I do not know any details of the NCAA / EA deal). I am critiquing the fact key parties in each case were not allowed a seat at the table.
On the issue of fairness, I was recently asked whether some Hollywood movie deals were "fair". If the actor/writer/talent/creator had a seat at the negotiating table, odds are that I would deem the deal to be "fair" -- they had a chance to either negotiate a "better" deal, or walk away from the deal if they didn't like the terms.
Two successful mystery writers dealt with the situation differently. At the time that Sara Paretsky sold Disney the movie rights to her heroine V.I. Warshawsky, Paretsky was quoted as saying she knew she might never see money beyond her advance, and that she would have minimal input on the movie...but that the advance meant she could realize her dream of becoming a full-time writer. On the other hand, Sue Grafton has refused from the beginning to sell the movie rights to her Kinsey Millhone series, because she was afraid of what Hollywood might do to her characters. [Note: I cannot find online citations for these, but my recollections are quite clear.]
Both Paretsky and Grafton had a seat at the table, and they made their own informed decisions. If only the libraries and the college athletes had that same opportunity.
Sunday, June 28, 2009
My cable company does something (almost) right
You may recall my rant last month about the cable company forcing me to pay even more for sports channels I don't want, just so I could keep Turner Classic Movies (TCM). Well, now I need to thank the cable company for doing something (almost) right.
Flipping channels one recent evening, we discovered that we now receive TCM in high-definition (HD). This was completely unannounced, essentially a stealth "upgrade". I'm very happy to have TCM HD, but why not trumpet this fact? Or at least announce it in a mailing?
Even the TCM website has no info (at least on the homepage) about being available in HD. Granted, the films sampled so far don't appear to be new HD transfers; but the picture quality is improved over the regular TCM channel.
Wouldn't you think that when a company gives its customers something for "free", they would at least alert their customers to it? (I put "free" in quotes in that sentence, because I expect the cable company to force me to pay somehow; if so, a new rant will be warranted.)
Flipping channels one recent evening, we discovered that we now receive TCM in high-definition (HD). This was completely unannounced, essentially a stealth "upgrade". I'm very happy to have TCM HD, but why not trumpet this fact? Or at least announce it in a mailing?
Even the TCM website has no info (at least on the homepage) about being available in HD. Granted, the films sampled so far don't appear to be new HD transfers; but the picture quality is improved over the regular TCM channel.
Wouldn't you think that when a company gives its customers something for "free", they would at least alert their customers to it? (I put "free" in quotes in that sentence, because I expect the cable company to force me to pay somehow; if so, a new rant will be warranted.)
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
2% of Gross better than 50% of Net
You may have wondered how a movie that generates hundreds of millions of dollars at the US box office (let alone box office from overseas, DVDs, TV sales, etc) can show zero dollars for those who receive a piece of the "net". You probably think, "why would a major movie studio keep pouring huge sums into producing movies if they don't turn a profit?"
And there's the rub: "profit" and "net" are two very different things.
In a "gross" deal, an actor or director (the "participant") would receive a percentage of the "Gross Receipts" collected by the studio. That term Gross Receipts is always defined by the contract between the studio and the participant. It ordinarily represents most of the cash received by the studio from distribution of the movie, with a few exceptions. The biggest of these exceptions is that money collected by the studio from sale of DVDs is ordinarily reported at 20% (this figure dates from when VHS and Beta video-cassettes were "new media" back in the 1980s).
Note also that while movie theaters may collect $100 at the box office, they typically pay about half of that to the studios; the half kept by the movie theaters goes to cover their rent, electricity, salaries, etc. (Movie theaters keep all of the money they collect from popcorn and candy; none of that goes to the studios.)
In a "net" deal, a participant would receive a percentage of the "Net Proceeds" of the movie. Note that the term Net Proceeds is often used (and defined in the contract) to differentiate it from something else which may be called "profits".
The amounts paid to the participants are referred to as "participations".
Contracts differ tremendously, but Net Proceeds are typically defined as Gross Receipts less the following items:
Distribution Fees and Interest can be very large numbers on hit films, and they (along with the 20/80 split of DVD receipts) are much of the difference between "Net Proceeds" and "profits".
Regardless of the perceived success of a movie, it is very rare for "Net Proceeds" actually to be reached.
The moral of the story is that 99.999% of the time, you are better off with a single-digit percentage of Gross Receipts than you are with a double-digit percentage of Net Proceeds.
And there's the rub: "profit" and "net" are two very different things.
In a "gross" deal, an actor or director (the "participant") would receive a percentage of the "Gross Receipts" collected by the studio. That term Gross Receipts is always defined by the contract between the studio and the participant. It ordinarily represents most of the cash received by the studio from distribution of the movie, with a few exceptions. The biggest of these exceptions is that money collected by the studio from sale of DVDs is ordinarily reported at 20% (this figure dates from when VHS and Beta video-cassettes were "new media" back in the 1980s).
Note also that while movie theaters may collect $100 at the box office, they typically pay about half of that to the studios; the half kept by the movie theaters goes to cover their rent, electricity, salaries, etc. (Movie theaters keep all of the money they collect from popcorn and candy; none of that goes to the studios.)
In a "net" deal, a participant would receive a percentage of the "Net Proceeds" of the movie. Note that the term Net Proceeds is often used (and defined in the contract) to differentiate it from something else which may be called "profits".
The amounts paid to the participants are referred to as "participations".
Contracts differ tremendously, but Net Proceeds are typically defined as Gross Receipts less the following items:
- Distribution Fees -- these fees vary from around 10% to 50% of the Gross Receipts from each of theatrical, DVD, and TV.
- Distribution Expenses -- the costs incurred by the studio to market and advertise the movie, plus the costs of the film prints shipped to theaters.
- Negative Cost -- the costs to produce the movie, the final result of which is the completed negative of the movie (from which positive prints will be made). This includes salaries for cast & crew, the costs of sets, special effects, travel to locations, costumes, music, etc.
- Interest -- this is charged by the studio at a contractually-defined rate, and is applied to Negative Costs, and often to Distribution Expenses as well.
- Participations -- this would certainly include Gross participations, and may also include Net participations paid to others
Distribution Fees and Interest can be very large numbers on hit films, and they (along with the 20/80 split of DVD receipts) are much of the difference between "Net Proceeds" and "profits".
Regardless of the perceived success of a movie, it is very rare for "Net Proceeds" actually to be reached.
The moral of the story is that 99.999% of the time, you are better off with a single-digit percentage of Gross Receipts than you are with a double-digit percentage of Net Proceeds.
Friday, May 15, 2009
More unfairness from Google book settlement
A few more thoughts to add to my recent post about the proposed Google books settlement:
Libraries are incurring significant unreimbursed costs as they provide books for scanning. Rick Prelinger (a board member of the Internet Archive) recently pointed out to me that it costs several dollars per book for librarians and conservators to inspect books, OK them for scanning, and reshelve them upon return. He says large libraries are running up costs in the millions, and some libraries are unlikely ever to agree to similar deals in the future. Thus, not only are our tax dollars and donations further supporting Google in their efforts, the fact that these costs are never recovered means that Google's effective monopoly is even more entrenched.
I noted in my earlier post that authors and publishers will receive a share of the revenues derived from books which were written and published by others. You might ask "why" or "how can this be"; both are good questions which deserve to be addressed in more detail.
The answer to "how" is fairly simple: for all books still under copyright protection, Google will report and remit revenue to a yet-to-be-built Book Registry. Authors and/or publishers of books under copyright must register their books with the Registry in order to receive their fair share of revenues. Any books still under copyright but not claimed by any author or publisher comprise what have become known as "orphan" books. Google will report and remit monies derived from orphan books, along with other books; in fact, Google may not even know which books are orphans. Any money that is derived from orphan books will first be put toward defraying the Registry's operating costs; any remaining "orphan" monies will be split between suitable charities and all registered authors/publishers by some "fair" formula. Thus, authors and publishers will receive funds for books to which they have no relation at all.
The answer to "why" is not so simple, except that the authors and publishers were the parties who filed the class-action suit. Libraries were not a party to the suit, so they're effectively left out.
Given that (a) the libraries (as supported by our tax dollars and donations) have preserved the books for decades to make scanning possible, and (b) given that the libraries have spent significant amounts of their own money preparing and shipping the books for scanning, doesn't it thus seem fair that the libraries ought to get a chance at the revenue stream? Perhaps a share of the "orphan" book money? Or a small (single-digit) percentage of all the money flowing into the registry? After all, without the work of the libraries, none of this new revenue-stream would have been possible.
Libraries are incurring significant unreimbursed costs as they provide books for scanning. Rick Prelinger (a board member of the Internet Archive) recently pointed out to me that it costs several dollars per book for librarians and conservators to inspect books, OK them for scanning, and reshelve them upon return. He says large libraries are running up costs in the millions, and some libraries are unlikely ever to agree to similar deals in the future. Thus, not only are our tax dollars and donations further supporting Google in their efforts, the fact that these costs are never recovered means that Google's effective monopoly is even more entrenched.
I noted in my earlier post that authors and publishers will receive a share of the revenues derived from books which were written and published by others. You might ask "why" or "how can this be"; both are good questions which deserve to be addressed in more detail.
The answer to "how" is fairly simple: for all books still under copyright protection, Google will report and remit revenue to a yet-to-be-built Book Registry. Authors and/or publishers of books under copyright must register their books with the Registry in order to receive their fair share of revenues. Any books still under copyright but not claimed by any author or publisher comprise what have become known as "orphan" books. Google will report and remit monies derived from orphan books, along with other books; in fact, Google may not even know which books are orphans. Any money that is derived from orphan books will first be put toward defraying the Registry's operating costs; any remaining "orphan" monies will be split between suitable charities and all registered authors/publishers by some "fair" formula. Thus, authors and publishers will receive funds for books to which they have no relation at all.
The answer to "why" is not so simple, except that the authors and publishers were the parties who filed the class-action suit. Libraries were not a party to the suit, so they're effectively left out.
Given that (a) the libraries (as supported by our tax dollars and donations) have preserved the books for decades to make scanning possible, and (b) given that the libraries have spent significant amounts of their own money preparing and shipping the books for scanning, doesn't it thus seem fair that the libraries ought to get a chance at the revenue stream? Perhaps a share of the "orphan" book money? Or a small (single-digit) percentage of all the money flowing into the registry? After all, without the work of the libraries, none of this new revenue-stream would have been possible.
Monday, May 4, 2009
Help! I'm being held hostage by cable sports channels
I'm a movie fan. Decades ago, in college, I learned to run 35mm projectors (we also ran 70mm, and we had variable-speed controls for silent pictures...but that's another story). As a kid, I borrowed 8mm versions of classics from the library, and ran them on the home-movie projector. I'm not (too) embarrassed to admit that I still have a library of LaserDiscs at home (LaserDiscs were effectively the 8-track tapes of the video business, a format that never caught on).
This is all to explain why I had no choice but to "upgrade" my cable package, because that was the only way I could keep Turner Classic Movies (TCM), the best channel around.
I didn't want the extra half-dozen sports channels that came with this "upgrade". I never even wanted basic ESPN, let alone the various ESPN spin-offs that are part of the new package. But I'm now paying much more, mostly for channels I don't watch and didn't want, just so I can keep TCM.
Why can't we buy cable channels a la carte? (I know the standard argument, and I'll get to it shortly.) Why can't I drop ESPN, which charges cable operators roughly $3 per cable-subscriber whether we watch or not? If I could drop ESPN, I ought to be able to cut my monthly bill by at least $3, perhaps more. If I could drop all the other sports channels, maybe I could save another $10-15.
I would happily pay $10 per month for TCM, if I could simply add it on the cheapest basic cable package.
The arguments about why a la carte pricing will inevitably lead to ruin for everybody run along these lines : The practice of "bundling" allows cable operators to use the popular channels to subsidize the less popular channels. Without bundling, only the popular will survive, the niche will die, and there will be fewer choices for all.
Maybe. Maybe not.
I'm sure there are far more households that would want ESPN than would want TCM. But maybe the way to balance this out is to charge variable pricing. If I want just one channel in addition to the basic package, maybe I pay $10 for it. If I want 5 channels, maybe they're $4 each. If enough fans of a "niche" channel are willing to pay more for it, perhaps it can survive.
None of the analyses I've seen considers variable pricing. Ardent fans of a channel could pay more (note that some tests of "free" song downloads with a price of "pay what you want" have actually generated significant amounts of money). And the price per channel could vary based on number of channels, similarity (or difference) of channels, any number of variables.
Until we see some tests and hard data on this, I'm not convinced that a la carte is a bad thing.
And the ability to stopped getting fleeced for a dozen sports channels I never watch would be fabulous!
This is all to explain why I had no choice but to "upgrade" my cable package, because that was the only way I could keep Turner Classic Movies (TCM), the best channel around.
I didn't want the extra half-dozen sports channels that came with this "upgrade". I never even wanted basic ESPN, let alone the various ESPN spin-offs that are part of the new package. But I'm now paying much more, mostly for channels I don't watch and didn't want, just so I can keep TCM.
Why can't we buy cable channels a la carte? (I know the standard argument, and I'll get to it shortly.) Why can't I drop ESPN, which charges cable operators roughly $3 per cable-subscriber whether we watch or not? If I could drop ESPN, I ought to be able to cut my monthly bill by at least $3, perhaps more. If I could drop all the other sports channels, maybe I could save another $10-15.
I would happily pay $10 per month for TCM, if I could simply add it on the cheapest basic cable package.
The arguments about why a la carte pricing will inevitably lead to ruin for everybody run along these lines : The practice of "bundling" allows cable operators to use the popular channels to subsidize the less popular channels. Without bundling, only the popular will survive, the niche will die, and there will be fewer choices for all.
Maybe. Maybe not.
I'm sure there are far more households that would want ESPN than would want TCM. But maybe the way to balance this out is to charge variable pricing. If I want just one channel in addition to the basic package, maybe I pay $10 for it. If I want 5 channels, maybe they're $4 each. If enough fans of a "niche" channel are willing to pay more for it, perhaps it can survive.
None of the analyses I've seen considers variable pricing. Ardent fans of a channel could pay more (note that some tests of "free" song downloads with a price of "pay what you want" have actually generated significant amounts of money). And the price per channel could vary based on number of channels, similarity (or difference) of channels, any number of variables.
Until we see some tests and hard data on this, I'm not convinced that a la carte is a bad thing.
And the ability to stopped getting fleeced for a dozen sports channels I never watch would be fabulous!
Monday, April 27, 2009
Google gets richer thanks to your tax dollars
For some time now, Google has been scanning millions of books, with the goal of making the contents available as part of its search results. The vast bulk of the books were provided by libraries, largely university libraries (both public and private). A group of publishers and authors filed a class-action suit against Google for copyright infringement (which the legal eagles at Google must have expected). Google, the authors, and the publishers have reached a proposed settlement agreement. (It runs over 130 pages, plus attachments which bring the total to well over 200 pages. I've slogged through it to bring you some highlights.)
Note that the libraries are not parties to the proposed settlement. The libraries, which have preserved the books in question for decades (with the help of our tax dollars), get very little out of this deal. Each library will be allowed to receive and keep one digital copy of any hard-copy book of theirs that Google scanned. And they can make this one copy available via only one single computer at the library. That's it. The libraries cannot provide the digital copy to a potential competitor of Google; nor could the libraries even use their digital copies to create their own consortium digital library.
The settlement allows Google to sell access to these digital books on a subscription basis; so the libraries can buy access to digital copies of their own books, to be made available on more than one computer.
Money that Google collects for access to digital books will be shared with authors and publishers. BUT money will be shared only if the author or publisher of a book still under copyright actually registers the book with a newly created Book Registry. Funds collected for use of un-registered books will be allocated amongst those authors and publishers who do register their own books. Thus, the vast corpus of "orphan" books (books still under copyright, but effectively abandoned by their author and publisher) will be generating money for Google, and for the publishers and authors of other books.
The libraries get nothing from this.
And Google will be able to sell access to public domain books (those whose copyrights have expired), without the need to share receipts with anyone (which is the way public domain books should be treated). BUT a rare public domain book, a hard-to-find book, which may exist in only a couple of libraries...well, shouldn't the library get something for their time and efforts in protecting and maintaining that book?
Shouldn't we, the taxpayers who supported those libraries and made the preservation of the books possible, get something from this?
Instead, Google gets a free pass to profit from the decades of work by librarians. The libraries and library-patrons get next-to-nothing.
Oh, and by the way, Google effectively has a monopoly on all those digital books. The only way for competition to appear would be for some other company to start scanning books, get sued by authors and publishers, and then settle with the authors and publishers.
Note that the libraries are not parties to the proposed settlement. The libraries, which have preserved the books in question for decades (with the help of our tax dollars), get very little out of this deal. Each library will be allowed to receive and keep one digital copy of any hard-copy book of theirs that Google scanned. And they can make this one copy available via only one single computer at the library. That's it. The libraries cannot provide the digital copy to a potential competitor of Google; nor could the libraries even use their digital copies to create their own consortium digital library.
The settlement allows Google to sell access to these digital books on a subscription basis; so the libraries can buy access to digital copies of their own books, to be made available on more than one computer.
Money that Google collects for access to digital books will be shared with authors and publishers. BUT money will be shared only if the author or publisher of a book still under copyright actually registers the book with a newly created Book Registry. Funds collected for use of un-registered books will be allocated amongst those authors and publishers who do register their own books. Thus, the vast corpus of "orphan" books (books still under copyright, but effectively abandoned by their author and publisher) will be generating money for Google, and for the publishers and authors of other books.
The libraries get nothing from this.
And Google will be able to sell access to public domain books (those whose copyrights have expired), without the need to share receipts with anyone (which is the way public domain books should be treated). BUT a rare public domain book, a hard-to-find book, which may exist in only a couple of libraries...well, shouldn't the library get something for their time and efforts in protecting and maintaining that book?
Shouldn't we, the taxpayers who supported those libraries and made the preservation of the books possible, get something from this?
Instead, Google gets a free pass to profit from the decades of work by librarians. The libraries and library-patrons get next-to-nothing.
Oh, and by the way, Google effectively has a monopoly on all those digital books. The only way for competition to appear would be for some other company to start scanning books, get sued by authors and publishers, and then settle with the authors and publishers.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
